The impact of financial leverage on farm technical efficiency during periods of price instability by Gadanakis, Yiorgos et al.
The impact of financial leverage on farm 
technical efficiency during periods of price  
instability 
Article 
Accepted Version 
Gadanakis, Y., Stefani, G., Lombardi, G. and Tiberti, M. 
(2019) The impact of financial leverage on farm technical 
efficiency during periods of price instability. Agricultural 
Finance Review. ISSN 0002-1466 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/85728/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
Published version at: https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/AFR-09-2018-0080/full/html 
Publisher: Emerald 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
Agricultural Finance Review
The impact of financial leverage on farm technical efficiency 
during periods of price instability
Journal: Agricultural Finance Review
Manuscript ID AFR-09-2018-0080.R3
Manuscript Type: Research Article
Keywords: financial leverage; technical efficiency; capital structure; expenditure capacity;, adjustment theory, price instability
 
Agricultural Finance Review
Agricultural Finance Review
1
The impact of financial leverage on farm technical efficiency during 
periods of price instability
Purpose: 
The main purpose of this work is to provide empirical evidence on the relationship between 
capital structure and technical efficiency for Italian cereal farms during the 2008 – 2014 
period. Emphasis is given in the understanding of the relationship between the level of 
financial leverage for cereal farms and their production performance. 
Methodology:
The methods employed in this research article are based on non-parametric techniques in 
order to derive technical efficiency estimates for a sample of Italian cereal farms based on 
available Farm Accountancy Data Network data to explore in depth the relationship amongst 
the financial exposure of the sector and the capacity to utilise an efficient and effective 
production technology. Furthermore, subsidies are considered in the model as a non-
discretionary variable and therefore, as an input that farmers cannot directly influence within 
the production function. Hence, the non-discretionary Data Envelopment Analysis model is a 
more appropriate framework since it is not penalising farms at a lower level of Pillar I 
payments when benchmarked with farms that receive higher level of payments.
Findings:
The results show that significant improvements could be achieved for most of the farms in 
the sample by improving production and management practices. Furthermore, results provide 
an empirical support of the adjustment theory by showing a negative impact of debt to asset 
ratio to technical efficiency. 
Originality:
This research article provides a first insight on the evolution of the Italian cereal farms debt-
technical efficiency relationship in periods where high price instability has been observed.
Keywords: financial leverage; price instability; technical efficiency; capital structure; expenditure 
capacity; 
Subject classification codes: Q12; Q14; D24
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1 Introduction
Farm capital structure may have contrasting effects on farm efficiency and investment 
behaviour as a strand of the farm efficiency literature has pointed out (Davidova and 
Latruffe, 2007, Barry and Robinson, 2001, Bojnec and Latruffe, 2013, Fertő et al., 
2017). In particular, farmers’ ability to choose the best available technology is restricted 
when capital structure negatively influences farm’s financial performance (Mugera and 
Nyambane, 2015). However, the opposite is supported by Berger and Bonaccorsi di 
Patti (2006) where they suggest that the performance of a decision-making unit (farm) 
may also have an impact on the choice of capital structure. Hence, farms operating on 
the production efficiency frontier are more likely to realise higher return for a given 
capital structure, and these higher earnings could be used as bulwark against portfolio 
risk (Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010). Therefore, this will allow farms to substitute equity 
for debt when considering their capital structure (Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010). As 
Pedersen and Olsen (2013) suggest, the evaluation of the performance of farming 
systems would be more effective if the holistic approach to leverage proposed by Barry 
and Baker (1971) is considered. Hence, when both the external and internal credit 
constraints are considered. External funding at a farm level is used to cover both 
production costs and to finance investment plans (machinery, specialised equipment, 
and buildings) in order to enhance farm production performance (Lambert et al., 2005). 
The debt is necessary to maintain or improve farm productivity and competitiveness by 
adopting technological innovation needed to increase farm efficiency (Featherstone et 
al., 2005). At the same time, financial leverage may affect farm technical efficiency by 
influencing farm production decision (Margaritis and Psillaki, 2007, Lambert and 
Bayda, 2015). Allocative efficiency may be constrained by lower farm expenditure 
capacity (Färe et al., 1990, Rungsuriyawiboon and Hockmann, 2015). In this case, 
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farms response may rely on reducing the necessary expenditures to maintain the 
production assets with negative consequences on farm productivity, growth and 
efficiency (Mugera and Nyambane, 2015).  In addition, it is possible that the farmer is 
not adopting the needed strategic adjustments to maintain productivity, efficiency and 
competitiveness (Hughes et al., 1985). The latter became relevant after the outbreak of 
the financial crisis in 2008 where the size of loans for farming industries increased. In 
particular, financial leverage (gearing) in the European Union (EU) jumped from 14.1% 
to 17.9% in 2008 indicating an increase in the size of debts (Pietola et al., 2011). Across 
the EU, the average farm debt increased from €39,118 in 2007 to €50,022 in 2008. 
Overall, total liabilities for both the EU-15 and the EU-N10 increased by approximately 
50% between 2004 and 2012 (European Commission, 2015). According to Petrick and 
Kloss (2013), the recent period of financial uncertainty (economic and financial crisis) 
came along with  the following short comes  due to the exposure of EU farmers to 
financial leverage: a) problems in the functionality of rural financial markets, b) 
reduction of farm incomes due to economic recession and c) lower demand for income 
elastic-food products. As stated by Hughes (1985) there are mainly three sources of 
financial stress for the farming sector: macroeconomic policies that in turn have an 
impact on prices and interest rates, sectoral policies that are often conceived to offset 
the former and individual management decisions. The period of 2008 – 2014, was 
characterised from a surge in price volatility that affected European and world cereal 
markets as well as profitability and cash flow of cereal farms (Tadesse et al., 2014). In 
addition, reduced public budget and spending cuts in agricultural and rural policies 
further limited the potential of agricultural policies to offset market volatility. The 
riskier economic environment, would have a negative impact on farmers gross 
investment and therefore in the long-term competitiveness of the sector and the ability 
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of the farmers to sustain operations and growth (technical efficiency) within a 
competitive agricultural market (Fertő et al., 2017, Bojnec and Latruffe, 2013, O’Toole 
and Hennessy, 2015). According to Petrick and Kloss (2013) the crisis of the banking 
sector in EU could potentially lead to a credit crunch for agricultural borrowers, by 
marrying the way that rural financial markets are functioning. Financial uncertainty 
could therefore lead to an increase of the level of debt over assets for the farming 
industry and hence threaten farm survival and potentially lead to the exit from the 
industry (Byrne et al., 2016, Musso and Schiavo, 2008). Furthermore, the period of 
2008 – 2014, was  characterised from surge in price volatility that affected European 
and world cereal markets (Tadesse et al., 2014). Thus, contributing further to an 
environment of financial uncertainty, price instability and high economic risk for the 
farmers. 
In the recent years since 2008, the economic recession and dwindling demand for 
income-elastic food products in Italy has caused a reduction on farm incomes and also a 
distortion in agricultural production due to limited access to credit for Italian farmers 
(Petrick Martin and Kloss, 2012). It is discussed in the literature that the relationship 
between capital structure and farm business performance is different from corporate 
firms due to characteristics1 that may result in different decision-making patterns at 
farm level and hence to capital structure (Zhengfei and Lansink, 2006).  The uncertainty 
in the financial environment (due to food price instability, economic recession, and 
other exogenous parameters) has affected the Italian cereal market from 2008 onwards. 
Therefore, cereal farmers had to adopt their strategies and production methods to cope 
1 Family members participating in the production process and decision-making, business life cycle, legal form and 
liability status, government support in the form of agri-environmental payments etc.
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with exogenous parameters such as the 2010 drop in commodity prices, and hence 
maintain a healthy financial structure. According to Eurostat, the Italian cereal industry 
has been dramatically affected by the price crisis of 2008-2010 as the value of 
production fell by more than 30% in 2009 and fully recovered only in 2011. In terms of 
comparison, the overall agricultural production decreased only by 8% in the same 
period. Noticeably, credit to agriculture became more and more important as the price 
instability unfolded. In 2014 the amount of bank loans to farms was about 20% higher 
than in 2008 as illustrated by the data from Bank of Italy. In the same years, the share of 
short-term loans rose from 56% to 70% of the total amount, an indication that farmers 
resorted to loan financing mainly to deal with liquidity problems and economic stresses. 
Thus, the objective of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the relationship 
between capital structure and technical efficiency for Italian cereal farms during the 
2008 – 2014 period based on available data derived from the Farm Accountancy Data 
Network (FADN). Emphasis is given in the understanding of the relationship between 
the level of financial leverage for a sample of cereal farms and their production 
performance. The manuscript contributes into the relevant literature since it provides a 
first insight on the evolution of the Italian cereal farms debt-technical efficiency 
relationship in periods where uncertainty affected both the financial and commodity 
markets. The analysis offers a better understanding on the relationship between short, 
intermediate and long-term debt of the Italian cereal farms. The basic hypothesis tested 
here is that of the impact that external debt has on the ability of the cereal farmer to 
adjust production decision and, consequently on the technical efficiency of the decision-
making unit (farm). In addition, it provides empirical evidence which helps to 
characterise the relationship between farm production and economic performance and 
the capital structure for the Italian cereal sector. The manuscript explores the Italian 
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cereal sector as one of the most representative production sector of the Italian 
agricultural industry after specialist olives2. Furthermore, cereal farmers represent a 
significant percentage of the rural population in Italy with an average of 43ha UAA 
with smaller farmers (less than 10ha) facing difficulties in dealing with the complexity 
of the Italian agricultural sector (Salvioni et al., 2009) hence, more likely to be 
negatively affected in periods of price instability and financial uncertainty. 
2 Farm performance and capital structure
Several theoretical explanations, often predicting contrasting evidence, have been put 
forward to explain the existence, if any, of a direct relationship between measures of 
indebtedness such as the leverage or Debt to Asset Ratio (DAR) and Technical 
Efficiency (TE) (Shaik, 2015). The relative theories, the direction of the relationship 
and the expected sign are summarised in Table 1. The DAR is in fact a leverage ratio 
which indicates how the agribusinesses have acquired their assets over a period of time. 
Together with other financial indicators it demo strates the future economic 
sustainability of the agribusiness and the potential of the business to meet its current 
debt obligations as well as whether the agribusiness has the ability to pay a return on 
their investment. According to Zhengfei and Lansink (2006) financial indicators may 
not fully reveal the relationship between farm performance and managerial activities to 
improve performance when the effect of financial leverage is taken into consideration. 
Instead, Zhengfei and Lansink (2006) suggest that a measure of TE which is 
independent of market prices is more appropriate.
2 Notably in terms of number of holdings 
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The Fisher separation theorem states that, under perfectly functioning financial markets, 
financial and investment decisions are independent. Therefore, TE, which depends on 
investment decisions, should not be related to the way investments are financed 
(Lambert et al., 2005). However, in the context of agricultural investment, according to 
O'Toole et al. (2014), the financing constraints affect farmers’ investment decisions 
through an excess reliance on internal farm funds for investment and farmer’s 
investment strategies are based on the business fundamentals such as profitability.
However, since the hypothesis of perfectly functioning financial markets is a rather 
restrictive one, especially in times of credit rationing, several alternative theoretical 
explanations have been advanced: free cash flow, agency cost and credit evaluation 
(Russell et al., 2017, Nadolnyak et al., 2017). The free cash flow model (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) posits that higher leverage reduces inefficiency by inducing stricter 
discipline on relaxed management which waste the abundant financial resources in self-
serving objectives against the interest of the principal (the ownership). High debt ratios 
reduce the waste of cash by managers either through the need to generate cash to repay 
the debt or through the menace of liquidation. In the farm context where management 
and ownership is usually reunited in the same subject, the farmers are agents urged by 
lenders (principals) to exert greater effort to be able to repay the debt (Barry and 
Robinson, 2001). 
The agency cost model (Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010) states a negative relationship 
between indebtedness and efficiency in a context of imperfect information as lenders 
transfer to borrowers the cost of monitoring thus, raising the costs of indebted farms. 
These additional costs are likely to reduce the TE of the affected farms in comparison 
with less indebted ones (Brewer and Featherstone, 2017). Both the agency cost and the 
free cash flow model hypothesise a causal relationship (even if with opposite sign) from 
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indebtedness to technical efficiency.  The credit evaluation hypothesis- also known as 
the efficiency risk hypothesis- postulates instead a reverse causation relationship where 
efficiency causes higher leverage as banks prefer borrowers with a low risk of financial 
distress (Parsons Chris and Titman Sheridan, 2011). Technical efficient firms may 
easily borrow as they are more likely to repay the debt (Demsetz, 1973, Berger and 
Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006, Pedersen and Olsen, 2013). The empirical relevance of this 
mechanism should be more salient in contexts where loan applications are usually 
evaluated according to solvency, repayment capability, profitability, management 
ability and other financial and managerial variables3 (Margaritis and Psillaki, 2007). 
Conversely where loans are granted mainly on the availability of adequate collaterals, as 
it is the case in Italy, the hypothesis is less relevant (Davidova and Latruffe, 2007, 
Latruffe et al., 2008). Other hypothesis on the indebtedness and TE relationship are 
specific to the farm sector: the capital embodiment theory and the adjustment cost 
theory (Rungsuriyawiboon and Hockmann, 2015). 
Table 1 Approximately here
Chavas and Aliber (1993) note that technical change in agriculture is often embodied in 
intermediate and long run assets such as machinery or new orchard varieties. If this is 
the case, then productivity improvements can be attained only by investing in the new 
3 Similarly, supply of credit to farmers has been found to positively correlate with observed changes in farm income. 
However, supply of operating ( short term) credit appears to be less reactive to changes in farm income with 
respect to supply of capital credit BARRY, P. J., BAKER, C. B. & SANINT, L. R. 1981. Farmers' Credit Risks 
and Liquidity Management. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 63, 216-227.
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technical assets which are often purchased and hence, resort farmers to being in debt 
(Sivertsson and Tell, 2015, Fertő et al., 2017)4. According to this theory more indebted 
farms should have a renovated technical capital and show higher technical efficiency.
The adjustment theory was first proposed by Paul et al. (2000) in discussing the impact 
of the 1986 liberalization reform of the Agricultural Policy in New Zealand. According 
to this theory the financial constraints faced by indebted farms reduced their ability to 
adjust the new deregulated environment thus decreasing their efficiency. In this case a 
negative relationship between indebtedness and TE is assumed. 
Hence, a variety of theories providing opposite predictions have been put forward to 
explain the DAR and TE relationship in the farm sector and beyond. Empirical evidence 
is mixed as far as it concerns the sign of the relationship while, exogeneity of debt is 
mainly assumed and not tested but for the case of Davidova and Latruffe (2007), as it is 
shown in Table 2
Table 2 Approximately here
Noticeably, a group of researchers decompose the overall DAR into the corresponding 
short term intermediate and long-term measures. In Chavas and Aliber (1993), Lambert 
et al. (2005) and Mugera and Nyambane (2015)  where intermediate DAR is analysed it 
is found to have a positive relationship with TE supporting the capital embodiment 
theory. Results about overall and short-term DAR are mixed even if more negative 
signs are observed. A number of factors are likely to affect the observed evidence. First, 
4 Farm investment is not only constrained by long term credit availability. Also short term credit availability may 
prompt reaction to restore this source of liquidity by adjustments which affect technical efficiency such as sales 
of capital assets ibid. 
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different methods are used to estimate the DAR and TE relationship either single stage 
stochastic frontier with simultaneous estimation of inefficiency model or two stage non-
parametric DEA estimates followed by OLS or Tobit estimation of the inefficiency 
model. Moreover, different specification of both the SFA and DEA model select several 
alternative TE measures and covariates that can affect the estimate of the parameter of 
DAR. Ultimately the historical and institutional context in which the investigated farms 
operate is likely to impact on the DAR and TE relationship (Giannetti, 2003), noticeable 
examples being the Davidova and Latruffe (2007) and Catherine et al. (2000).
This study will employ non-parametric techniques in order to derive TE estimates for a 
sample of Italian cereal farms to explore in depth the relationship amongst the financial 
exposure of the sector and the capacity to utilise an efficient and effective production 
technology. Considering that loans in the Italian agribusiness sector are granted based 
on collateral we assume that DAR impacts TE and hence, the credit evaluation 
hypothesis is not relevant in this context. However, we cannot dismiss a priori any of 
the other hypothesis put forward by the literature in regards to the sign of the 
relationship between DAR and TE, not least the adjustment theory. Indeed, since our 
sample is covering the period 2008 to 2014 we take into consideration two factors that 
have significantly contributed to the financial distress of Italian cereal farms (economic 
and commodity price instability). By promoting the understanding in regards to 
financial capital structure, and the provision of a new insight into the relationship 
between DAR and TE for the Italian cereal sector, this study is contributing to the 
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development of relevant policy and fiscal interventions such as those envisaged by the 
recently proposed Agriculture Italian Guarantee Multiregional Platform (AIGMP)5.  
3 Methods and data
Farm accountancy data for the empirical model was derived from Rete di Informazione 
Contabile Agricola (RICA), the Italian equivalent of FADN. The average size of the 
sample is about 11,000 farms per year between 2008 - 2014. The survey is performed 
by the former National Institute of Agricultural Economics and is responsible for 
collecting both financial and structural data for an individual farm. Although the RICA 
dataset is a partially rotating panel, for the purposes of this study is considered as a 
repeated cross-sectional sample. Cereal Farms amount to about 11% of the total 
sampled farms, a figure in line with the weight of cereal farms over total Italian 
agricultural holdings (Figure 1). With over 4 billion Euro of output in 2014, Italy was 
the third cereal producer in the European Union after France and Germany and just 
above UK and Poland.
5 Instruments to optimise the use of capital aimed at facilitating access to credit and investment for small and medium 
sized farms and agribusinesses and hence improve the competitiveness of the Italian agri-food sector 
(https://en.cdp.it/Clients/Financial-Institutions/Instruments-To-Optimise-The-Use-Of-Capital/Agri-
Platform/AGRI-Platform.kl)
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Figure 1: Number of holdings by main type of farming in Italy (2010 data)
Source: EUROSTAT, Agricultural Census in Italy (2012) 
Efficiency was estimated by carrying out an input-oriented sub-vector DEA model for 
each year6 of the sample and for each Italian macro-region7 under the constraint of 
constant returns to scale, thus obtaining total technical efficiency (TTE) estimates. The 
sub-vector (SBV) or non-discretionary DEA model has been used to account for the 
non-discretionary input of the CAP pillar one subsidies.  It is assumed that farmers have 
no control over the amount of money that they receive and hence it is an input that they 
cannot directly influence within the production function. Therefore, a non-discretionary 
or SBV DEA model is used to evaluate input use efficiency estimates for cereal farms. 
6  For this reason we considered nominal and not deflated values.
7 Italian macro-regions are defined as NUTS1 regions (North West, North East, Centre, South, Islands). To obtain 4 
similarly sized sub samples we aggregated South Italy with the Islands resulting in 4 macro-regions.
Page 12 of 39Agricultural Finance Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Agricultural Finance Review
13
According to Gadanakis and Areal (2018) the SBV DEA model is more suitable to 
correctly assess the relative performance of each farm and therefore, account for the 
effect of the annual variation in amount of subsidies that the farmers receive in 
production efficiency.  A detailed discussion and the results of a meta-analysis in regard 
to the treatment of subsidies in the estimation of technical efficiency is available in 
(Minviel and Latruffe, 2016). The importance of subsidies in technical efficiency 
(Latruffe et al., 2016) is not ignored by the model, instead, it is consider as a parameter 
that could have an impact on the efficiency outcome.  Therefore, as a non-discretionary 
variable, subsidies are not used to penalise farms at a lower level of Pillar I payments 
when benchmarked in DEA with farms that receive higher level of payments. The DEA 
model includes two outputs (the value in Euros of the production of cereals and other 
agriculture products) and five inputs: the value in Euros of fixed capital costs 
(depreciation) and intermediate consumption, the total labour used per farm in Annual 
Working Units (AWU), the utilized agricultural area (UAA) in hectares and the 
Common Agricultural Policy 1st pillar subsidies received per farm (see Table 3 for 
variable definitions). Since DEA results are highly sensitive to the presence of outliers, 
we carried out a statistical method based on the algorithm proposed by Billor et al. 
(2000) for the detection of multiple outliers in multivariate data. 
Table 3: Approximately here
Table 4 reports summary statistics for the variables included in the DEA model. The 
average value of Pillar I subsidies remains nearly constant over the period, as well as 
the amount of utilized agricultural area (UAA) and labour (Annual Working Units). 
However, the value of fixed capital costs slightly increases over the period under 
consideration, while the value of intermediate consumption remains constant over 2008-
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2010 and increases in 2011 and 2012 (22% increase) reaching its peak in 2013 (38,000 
€). In regards to crop output we observe a significant variation in the period under 
consideration with the lowest values of crop output in 000s euros observed in 2009 
(42,000 €) and the highest in 2012 (60,000 €). Other agricultural ouput is higher in the 
years prior to 2010 (12,000 €) while it drops to an average of 7,000 € for the remaining 
of the period.
Table 4: Approximately here
To formalise the above let us assume that we observe a set of  farms and each farm n
 has a set of inputs and outputs representing multiple performance measures. i = {1,..,n}
Considering then that each farm  uses   inputs,   to produce  outputs i J (j = 1, ⋯,J) xj S yr 
 The general form of an input-oriented DEA dual model (conventional (r = 1,⋯,S).
(CNV) DEA model) with all inputs variable is as follows:
 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜃,𝜆𝑖 𝜃′𝑖𝐶𝑁𝑉
 𝑠.𝑡.       𝜃 𝑥′𝑗𝑖 ≥ ∑𝑛𝑖 = 1𝜆𝑖𝑥𝑗𝑖                                   (𝑖)
                𝑦′𝑟𝑖 ≤ ∑𝑛𝑖 = 1𝜆𝑖𝑦𝑟𝑖                                      (𝑖𝑖)
               𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0                                                         (𝑖𝑖𝑖)
  (1)
Where,  , is a scalar, representing the efficiency score for each of the  farms θ′iCNV n
estimated by the CNV DEA model. The estimate will satisfy the restriction  with θi ≤ 1
the value  indicating an efficient farm. This is because the ratio is formed relative θi = 1
to the Euclidean distance from the origin over the production possibility set. 
Also, in the above formulation we consider that there is a set of discretionary or variable 
inputs ,  and a set of non-discretionary inputs   DI DI ⊂  {1, ⋯,j} NDI, NDI = {1,⋯,F}
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 that cannot be adjusted or are held fixed at least in the ∖ DI =  {h ∈ {1,⋯J}│h ∉  DI}
short run.  The combination of the DI and NDI variables therefore defines the 
technology set :PSBV
 PSBV = {(xDIji, xNDIji,yri)│xDIji and xNDIji can produce yri} (2)
As suggested by Bogetoft and Otto (2010) in cases where DI and NDI variables exist, a 
traditional and popular variation of the Farrell (1957) procedure is used to solve the 
linear DEA programme with respect to the largest proportional reduction in the DI 
variables alone.
𝜃((𝑥𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑖, 𝑥𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑖,𝑦𝑟𝑖);𝑃) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜃{𝜃│(𝜃𝑥𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑖, 𝑥𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑖,𝑦𝑟𝑖) ∈ 𝑃} (3)
The linear DEA programme can therefore be modified as follows where only the DI 
variables are reduced. Thus, the input use DEA efficiency score when accounting pillar 
one subsidy variations for observation  is estimated by the following linear x′, θ′, 
programming (LP) problem:
 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜃,𝜆𝑖 𝜃′𝑆𝐵𝑉
 𝑠.𝑡.          𝜃𝑥′𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑖 ≥ ∑𝑛𝑖 = 1𝜆𝑖𝑥𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑖         𝑗 ∈ 𝐷𝐼    (𝑖)
                 𝑥′𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑖 ≥ ∑𝑛𝑖 = 1𝜆𝑖𝑥𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑗𝑖         𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝐷𝐼  (𝑖𝑖)
                        𝑦′𝑟𝑖 ≤ ∑𝑛𝑖 = 1𝜆𝑖𝑦𝑟𝑖                              (𝑖𝑖𝑖)
               𝜆𝑖 ≥ 0                                                         (𝑖𝑣)
               
(4)
Where, xDIji is the jth discretionary input for farm i , xNDIji  is the jth non-discretionary 
input for farm i and yri  is the rth output for farm i,  i=(1,⋯n), j=(1,⋯m)  and r=(1,⋯s)  . 
The optimal value  represents the SBV efficiency score for each farm and its values θ′iSBV
lie between 0 and 1. This efficiency score indicates the degree to which a farm can 
reduce the use of its discretionary inputs without decreasing the level of outputs 
regarding the best performers or benchmarking farms in the sample. The first two 
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constraints limit the proportional decrease in both discretionary (equation - 4(i)) and 
non-discretionary (equation - 4(ii)) inputs, when  is minimised in relation to the θ′iSBV
input use achieved by the best observed technology. The third constraint ensures that 
the output generated by the ith farm is less than that on the frontier. All three constraints 
ensure that the optimal solution belongs to the production possibility set. The final 
constraint expressed by the equation 4(iv), called also the convexity constraint, ensures 
the CRS assumption of the DEA SBV model (Cooper et al., 2006).
The DEA model under the Variable Returns to Scale assumption (the constrain in 𝑖𝑣, 
equation (4) is now  decomposes technical efficiency into pure technical 𝜆𝜄 = 1)
efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE) (Fare et al., 1993) . Therefore, by estimating 
technical efficiency scores under assumptions of CRS (TECRS) - known as a measure of 
overall technical efficiency (OTE) - and VRS (TEVRS) one can measure the SE which 
measures the impact of scale size on the productivity of the farm. SE efficiency is 
therefore defined as follows: 
          𝑆𝐸 =  𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑉𝑅𝑆
 can take values between 0 and 1. When  a farm is operating at optimal scale 𝑆𝐸 𝑆𝐸 = 1
size and otherwise if . The information revealed by  is used to indicate potential 𝑆 < 1 𝑆𝐸
benefits from adjusting farm size. Furthermore,  can be used to decompose  𝑆𝐸 =  𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑇𝐸𝑉𝑅𝑆
TECRS into two mutually exclusive and non-additive components, the pure technical 
efficiency (PTE) (estimated by the VRS specification) and . 𝑆𝐸       𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑅𝑆 =  𝑇𝐸𝑉𝑅𝑆 ∗ 𝑆𝐸    
This allows an insight into the source of inefficiencies. The  specifies the possible 𝑇𝐸𝑉𝑅𝑆
efficiency improvement that can be achieved without altering the scale of operations. 
On the other hand, the  and  measures require the farm to adjust its scale of 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝑅𝑆 𝑆𝐸
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operation to improve efficiency and therefore should be viewed as long run measure 
that aims to reduce inputs for the long run improvement in efficiency.Furthermore, to 
investigate the impact of indebtedness on farm performance we have used the two stage 
semi-parametric model as it suggested in Simar and Wilson (2007).
Studies measuring productivity and efficiency using DEA to investigate the impact of 
environmental factors (a vector of  variables that can either be continuous or discrete) 𝑧
at a second stage analysis have suffered from two problems. 1) Serial correlation among 
the DEA estimates and 2) Correlation of the inputs and outputs used in the first stage 
with second-stage environmental variables (Simar and Wilson, 2007). A solution to 
these problems consists of bootstrapping the results to obtain confidence intervals for 
the first stage productivity or efficiency scores (Simar and Wilson (1999, Simar and 
Wilson, 2007). The significance of the Simar and Wilson (2007) double bootstrap 
procedure derives from the bias corrected efficiency estimation of  (estimated by θ′iSBV
expression (4)). These estimates are used as parameters in a truncated regression model. 
A detailed presentation of the double bootstrapped procedure and the Algorithm 1 used 
in this paper is available in Simar and Wilson (2007). 
The truncated model to solve is of the form:
𝑦 =  𝑧𝑖𝛽 +  𝜀𝑖
Where, the bias corrected efficiency estimates,  a vector of environmental variables 𝑦 𝑧𝑖
(a vector of farm control variables),  a vector of parameters to be estimated and is 𝛽 𝜀𝑖 
the error term. 
Table 5 reports summary statistics of the lagged leverage and control variables included 
in the regression model. Since the lagged leverage is considered in the analysis, data 
related to year 2008 will be dropped and the period 2009 – 2014 will be considered in the 
truncated regression model. This will also have an impact into the number of observations 
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(reduced/year) as it is demonstrated in Table 5. The control variables selection allows for 
testing the main management and structural characteristic of Italian cereal farms in 
relation to technical efficiency and financial performance. In order to capture any 
potential variation across the different Italian regions, regional dummies are introduced 
which divide the country into the North East (NE), North West (NW), Central, South and 
to the Island regions. The North West region is considered as the base category for the 
analysis since it is the most industrialised and developed region in the country (referred 
as the “Industrial Triangle” Milan, Turin Genoa). The regional dummies are used to 
explore differences in technical efficiency amongst farm businesses and therefore, 
identify areas where interventions are required in the form of policy support or extension 
services. Apart from regional dummies the analysis builds on variables which consider 
farmer and farm characteristics to provide further insight to the structural characteristics 
of the farm system and the relationship to technical efficiency.  Farmer characteristics 
such as age and years in education of the farmer are considered to explore the relationship 
between managerial capabilities and technical efficiency. Hence, it is assumed that a 
younger farmer with more years in education would be keener to adopt contemporary 
methods of production and therefore be technical efficient. In addition, the role of gender 
in decision making and technical efficiency is explored. Th  variable associated to the 
share of rented land is testing the assumption that farmers with a higher percentage of 
rented land are more technical efficient as it is also the case of farm business with a high 
share of family labour. Furthermore, the share of tangible assets over total assets is 
considered in order to measure the impact of over capitalisation of the Italian cereal sector 
and it’s impact to technical efficiency. In addition, a dummy for farms located in 
municipalities classified as less favoured areas (LFAs) was used to test the assumption of 
LFAs having limited access to resources and therefore being least technical efficient.
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Table 5: Approximately here
The (lagged) level of indebtedness or leverage is the main variable of interest. It has 
been constructed as the ratio of total liabilities over total assets. Although, the value for 
the DAR is very low, with small changes over the period 2009-2014, it is important to 
focus on this ratio since it will allow us to explore the financial sustainability of the 
cereal farms in Italy. The ratio of tangible to total assets shows a decline over the period 
2009-2014, revealing a relative decrease in long-term investments. In addition, the 
analysis is considering the disaggregation of the DAR into the lagged long term and the 
short-term DAR. Hence, the second stage regression is considering two variants of the 
model. The assumption behind these two models is that the model with the lagged long 
term and the contemporaneous short-term DAR is exploring further the impact of short-
term DAR into technical efficiency as it is discussed in Barry et al. (1981). Hence, 
explore how the short-term DAR can demonstrate the use of short run credit as a reserve 
that provides liquidity to the business within an uncertain financial environment. 
3 Results and discussion
A summary of the DEA SBV model results is presented in Table 6. The figures of mean 
efficiency represent the average potential equiproportional input reduction keeping 
constant the output, so smaller scores reveal greater inefficiency. An increase in the 
average efficiency score is observed in 2012 and is then maintained to similar levels for 
the remaining of the period under consideration. In addition, results indicate that 
efficiency is quite dispersed especially in the harvest periods of 2008, 2009 and 2010 
(SD = 0.229, 0.235 and 0.227 respectively). These results suggest the need for 
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improvements in production and management practices for the majority of the farms in 
the sample. In particular, it could be suggested that a 44% equiproportional reduction in 
the use of inputs is required for 2008, 42% for 2009, 40% for 2010, 34% for 2011, 30% 
for 2012, 32% for 2013 and 30.2% 2014.  In addition, it can be observed that the overall 
mean efficiency over the period of interest has increased to 0.698 in 2014 when 
compared to 0.561 in 2008. Similarly, the number of efficient farms on the frontier has 
also increased from 8.70% of the farms in the sample in 2008 to 13.97% for 2014. 
However, to conclude on the progress of technical efficiency a dynamic efficiency 
model is required (Namiotko and Balezentis, 2017).  It is important though to mention 
that we observe a positive shift of the number of farms towards the efficient frontier. 
Overall, a shift towards a more technical efficient status for the farms in the sample is 
observed since the percentage of farms with an efficient score less than 0.5 has 
decreased to 33.65% when compared to the 61.76 in 2008. This is in line with Cechura 
et al. (2015) that have observed similar catching-up and falling behind processes for 
most of the EU cereal producers. In particular, technological change contributed 
positively towards technical efficiency of the Italian cereal sector and specifically for 
the years 2012 and 2014 while lower levels of technical efficiency have been observed 
for the years prior to 2010. This positive progress on technical efficiency for Italian 
cereal farms is also observed by Latruffe et al. (2016)  where a positive association 
between subsidies and TE is observed and especially for the after decoupling period 
(2003 CAP reform).  Moreover, Gitto (2017) has observed the same patterns for the 
different regions in Italy with North region being the most TE area in Italy when the 
agricultural sector is considered. 
Table 6: Approximately here
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During the 2008 – 2014 period, on average 12% of the farms operated under constant 
returns to scale, hence indicating that a percentage of the farms in the sample is not 
required to adjust their scale of operations in order to improve efficiency in the long 
run. However, the majority of the farms is operating under a status of decreasing or 
increasing returns to scale and therefore, adjustment in the scale of operations is 
required in the long term. Table 7 presents the distribution of the efficiency estimates 
for both the pure technical efficiency (VRS DEA) and the scale efficiency (SE).  The 
average pure technical efficiency between 2018 - 2014 is 0.72 and is higher than the 
overall technical efficiency as it is estimated by the SBV CRS DEA model (mean 
SBVeff = 0.64). Hence, it indicates that Italian farms have a greater ability to catch up 
with technological changes when compared to their ability to allocate resources and 
adjust their management practices.   
Table 7: Approximately here
In addition, the Fare et al. (1985) procedure (to define the status of increasing or 
decreasing returns to scale) concluded that most of the farms in the sample in average 
operate under increasing returns to scale (61%), followed by farms operating under 
diminishing returns to scale (25%). The latter could be used as an indicator of 
overcapitalisation or over mechanisation of the Italian cereal sector while the high 
percentage of increasing returns to scale is an indicator demonstrating the need for 
further improvements in the scale of operations and scale efficiency of the Italian cereal 
farms. The remaining of the sample operates under constant returns to scale.
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Table 8: Approximately here
The results of the model where the lagged long-term DAR and the contemporaneous 
short-term DAR are considered are summarised in Table 9. In both models, hence, 
either in the model where the lagged DAR is considered (Table 8), or where the lagged 
long term DAR and the contemporaneous short term DAR (Table 9) are considered, the 
negative impact of DAR in 2010 may be viewed as an empirical support of the 
adjustment theory posited by Paul et al. (2000). Indeed, the years 2009-2010 were 
characterized by a dramatic drop in the cereal prices (-30% in 2009) which was 
followed in 2010 by a timid increase by 6%, still far below the 2007-2008 level. In 
2011, prices were back to the peak of 2008 and stayed more stable for the following 
years. Thus, years 2009 and 2010 were particularly unfavourable for the cereal industry 
because of both the drop in output prices and the adverse terms of trade8. Therefore, 
financial exposure seems to be a source of inefficiency in time of price instability when 
farms need to face adjustment hardship to cope with rapidly changing price scenarios. 
The drop in cereal prices increases the financial constraints faced by indebted farms, 
thus reducing their ability to cope with higher financial stress and in turn decreasing 
their efficiency as is also indicated by the results of the SBV CRS DEA model (lower 
mean efficiency scores for 2008, 2009 and 2010 within the period). Furthermore, the 
negative sign observed for 2010 is also compatible with the agency cost theory of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) as it is also discussed in Latruffe et al. (2016). Overall, 
8 It is worth noticing that an adverse term of trade arises again in 2014 when the output price 
index is still falling from its 2011 peak whereas the input price index reaches a peak 
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across the period under consideration an inconsistency is observed in terms of the 
direction of the relationship between the DTA and TE for the Italian cereal farms which 
is also concluded in other studies (Latruffe et al., 2016, Davidova and Latruffe, 2007). 
Table 9: Approximately here
Furthermore, tangible to total assets is another variable which in all years negatively 
impacts on efficiency. One possible reason for the negative impact of the ratio is the 
overcapitalization of Italian small farms which often are over mechanized. This is also 
in line with the finding of the returns to scale analysis where 25% of the farms in the 
sample operate under diminishing returns to scale. 
Also farms with higher proportion of rented land are less efficient perhaps because of 
agency problems stemming from misalignment of farmer and landowner incentives, as 
posited by Giannakas et al. (2001), Hadley (2006) and Michler and Shively (2015). This 
in fact indicates that ownership of the land has a positive impact to technical efficiency 
since increases the incentives of the farmer to maximise effort and hence achieve higher 
production output (Michler and Shively, 2015, Heath, 2015). Another possible 
explanation may be found in reduced farmers’ attitude towards long-term investment as 
effect of land tenure. As it has been expected farming systems based within LFAs will 
be less technical efficient when compared with the remaining farms in the sample with 
an exception of year 2009 where the coefficient is positive and statistically significant 
(0.05, p-value <0.05). For LFAs in years 2010 – 2014, the relationship is negative, 
though it is statistically significant only for the years 2011 and 2012. Finally, the 
coefficients of regional dummies reveal that cereal farms in North Italy (mainly North-
Western regions and Central regions) are on average more efficient than in those located 
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in the Island and Southern regions (Gitto, 2017).  Especially for the Southern regions 
the results indicate that for the 2009 and 2010 the coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant (-0.06 and -0.12 respectively, p-value < 0.01). However, the relationship 
sign is changing for the remaining of the period without though this being statistically 
significant. The years of education of conductor, a proxy for human capital, has a 
positive sign for all years in consideration but it is statistically significant only for the 
years 2009 and 2010. Furthermore, considering the gender of farm conductor is 
negative for the period under consideration but only statistically significant for the years 
2009, 2010, 2012 and 2013. The results associated with the two age dummy variables of 
conductor provide a mixed outcome and it is difficult to draw a clear conclusion.  
Considering the variable of interest i.e. DAR, the results confirm most of the findings in 
the literature regarding technical efficiency and its relationship to debt to asset ratio 
where a variation in the direction of the relationship is stated. The results contribute to 
the discussion regarding the best way to pursue structural adjustment in Italy which so 
far is left to market forces with dramatic surge in the percentage of rented UAA in Italy. 
Further and more targeted research is needed on this point. The lower TE estimates of 
Southern regions and especially in the years where price instability is observed (2009 
and 2010) is of particular interest for policy makers since it confirms the overall need 
for further supporting agricultural systems based in the South of Italy in the form of 
investment subsidies and mechanisms that could contribute to the absorption of market 
price shocks. Indeed. the empirical results presented in Table 8 and Table 9 support the 
adjustment theory. Moreover, as it has been indicated by Gitto (2017) for Italian regions 
and as it has also been demonstrated by Latruffe et al. (2016) the positive shift of the 
farms to the frontier could be interpreted as an indication that decoupled payments have 
a positive influence on allocative efficiency. Therefore, it gives an indication of the 
Page 24 of 39Agricultural Finance Review
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Agricultural Finance Review
25
direction that the support designed to facilitate access to credit and investment needs to 
take. This is extremely important when considering the small size of the Italian 
specialised cereal farms and their contribution to the rural economy. 
4 Conclusions
In this paper, an SBV CRS DEA model was utilised to measure farm output efficiency 
of Italian cereal farms and to assess the relationship between farm capital structure and 
farm efficiency in the eve of the upsurge of cereal price instability in years 2008 - 2014 
and financial uncertainty. The empirical findings show that the relationship between 
farm efficiency and leverage is not statistically significant for all years but 2010. 
Interestingly, 2009 is the very year when cereal prices dropped by almost 30% after the 
upsurge of 2007 - 2008 thus posing a significant stress on cereal farmers reflected to the 
technical efficiency of 2010. Similarly, to the policy induced price drop analysed by 
Paul et al. (2000) in New Zealand, results provide support for the adjustment theory as a 
possible explanation of the negative relationship between DAR and farm technical 
efficiency.  According to this theory the financial constraints faced by indebted farms 
reduced their ability to adjust the dramatic deregulation of the agricultural sector in New 
Zealand, thus decreasing their efficiency.  In the 2010 case a price shock caused a 
collapse of the output value as the one observed in New Zealand after the reform which 
in turn financially stressed especially indebted farms. As far as the authors know, no 
other study has highlighted the negative effect of such stress on the technical efficiency 
of Italian cereal farms. The paper contributes to the ongoing literature about the 
relationship of farm indebtedness and technical efficiency, a literature which posits a 
number of different testable propositions derived from alternative theoretical models. 
Every new empirical study which provides evidence against or in favour of a specific 
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model contributes to the development of this strain of the agricultural finance 
theoretical debate.
In addition, our findings contribute to the debate on policy interventions aimed at 
mitigating the effect of price instability on farm economic sustainability. Underlining 
the relationship between financial constraints and farm flexibility to adapt to price 
instability, our results suggest the provision of additional support to increase the ability 
of farmers to cope with sharp price variations. Notably exploring the impact of a 
number of variables on TE we provide also suggestions on possible dimensions of the 
relative vulnerability of farms in times of high price instability. This type of information 
may prove relevant to policy makers when debating the focus and the direction of 
specific policy interventions for the agricultural sector (i.e. which regions in the country 
to focus, deciding on which age group and what other sociodemographic characteristics 
to consider, tenure status etc.). The paper presents a number of limitations that hint to 
further developments. The current DEA model is static. A dynamic model (a time 
variant dynamic model) could further explore the relationship between DAR and 
efficiency within the adjustment theory even if this would come at the cost of reduced 
external validity due to the rotated panel nature of the Italian FADN. Also the role of 
prices changes is only indirectly implied in the model by comparing results from 
different years, a further development may take into account this limit for instance using 
unit values as a covariate. Finally, the results indicate that the adjustment theory might 
be even more relevant for more capital-intensive agricultural sectors (dairy industry) 
beyond the cereal farming sector which has been the focus of this paper. However, the 
cereal sector is the one that experienced the largest rise in price instability in the 
considered period, thus remaining a valid case to study the relationship between DAR 
and TE despite its relatively low capital intensity.
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Table 1: Theorethical findings on the relationship between Debt to Asset Ratio (DAR) and 
Technical Efficiency.
Theory Direction of the 
Relationship
Expected sign of 
Relationship
Reference
Fisher separation theorem - - Lambert et al., 2005
Free cash flow model DAR  TE Positive Jensen and Meckling, 1976)
Agency cost model DAR  TE Negative Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010
Credit evaluation hypothesis TE  DAR Positive Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti 
(2006)
Capital embodiment theory DAR  TE Positive Chavas and Aliber (1993b)
Adjustment theory DAR  TE Negative Paul et al. (2000)
Table 2: Empirical findings on the relationship between Debt to Asset Ratio (DAR) and 
Technical Efficiency.
Authors Country Endogeneity of debt Sign of relationship
D. Lambert et al. (2005) USA (assumed) - (short term DAR)
+ (intermediate DAR)
A.W. Mugera and Nyambane 
(2015)
Australia (assumed) + (short term DAR)
ns (long term DAR)
Chavas and Aliber (1993a) USA (assumed) ns (short term DAR)
+ (intermediate DAR)
+ (long term DAR)
Hadley (2006) UK (assumed) - (DAR)
Davidova and Latruffe (2007) Czech Rep. (tested and rejected for 
private farms)
- (DAR) depending on farm type
Denmark & 
Poland
(account for endogeneity) - (DAR)
Latruffe, Bravo-Ureta, 
Carpentier, and Desjeux (2016) Spain + (DAR)
Giannakas, Schoney, and 
Tzouvelekas (2001)
Canada (assumed) + (DAR)
New Zealand (assumed) - (DAR)
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Table 3: Definition of variables used in the DEA sub-vector model
Variable Definition
  
Crop Output (000€) Total crop output ( sales+change in stocks+ farmhouse consumption) net of 
subsidies, of cereal crops
Other Agricultural Output (000€) Total agricultural output net of subsidies  - crop output
Pillar I subsidies (000€) Subsidies ( CAP first pillar) excludinged investment subsidies
Labour (AWU) Number of total Annual Work Units
UAA H(ha) Utilized Agricultural Area in hectares 
Intermediate consumption (000€) Total intermediate consumption ( total specific costs + total farming overheads)
Fixed capital costs (000€) Depreciation
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of outputs and inputs used in the DEA sub-vector model
 2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Crop Output (000€) 46 73 42 74 51 71 58 78 60 75 56 76 58 86
Other Agricultural Output (000€) 12 21 11 21 7 13 8 15 6 11 7 13 7 14
Pillar I subsidies (000€) 19 29 20 29 20 32 21 31 20 29 21 32 21 37
Labour (AWU) 1.1 0.8 1.1 0.8 1.1 0.7 1.2 0.8 1.2 0.8 1.2 0.8 1.2 0.8
UAA (haHa) 43.8 53.9 45 51.6 43.4 49.3 44.2 49.7 42.9 45.5 43.4 48.2 43.1 47.7
Intermediate consumption (000€) 32 39 31 38 31 43 37 47 38 46 38 48 38 50
Fixed capital costs (000€) 7 10 7 11 6 11 6 11 6 10 6 11 6 12
Number of observations 1517 1332 1292 1292 1265 1229 1052
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Table 5: Summary statistics of the control variables included in the regression model
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
CRS eff. scores 0.57 0.23 0.60 0.22 0.67 0.19 0.69 0.19 0.68 0.19 0.69 0.19
Lagged Debt to asset ratio (DAR) 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.11
Lagged Long term DAR 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03
Contemporaneous Short  term DAR 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09
Share tangible assets 0.79 0.24 0.73 0.27 0.73 0.26 0.69 0.27 0.67 0.28 0.64 0.29
Share farm labour 0.94 0.17 0.95 0.16 0.95 0.16 0.95 0.16 0.95 0.14 0.95 0.14
Education in years 8.13 3.78 8.72 3.53 8.69 3.65 8.75 3.53 8.75 3.39 9.07 3.34
Age (Years) 57.91 14.24 57.83 14.31 58.75 13.89 59.23 13.95 59.55 13.90 58.60 13.41
Share rented land (%) 0.37 0.42 0.39 0.42 0.35 0.41 0.37 0.41 0.38 0.42 0.42 0.41
Young (%) 11% 11% 8% 7% 7% 7%
Elder (%) 31%  32%  34%  34%  35%  33%  
Female (%) 16% 16% 17% 17% 16% 16%
Farms in total LFA (%) 27%  26%  27%  26%  28%  23%  
Region NW (%) 34% 41% 32% 34% 33% 41%
Region NE (%) 24%  20%  24%  22%  22%  23%  
Region Central (%) 20% 18% 19% 21% 22% 16%
Region South (%) 18%  19%  23%  21%  21%  18%  
Region Islands (%) 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Number of observations 1002  741  953  897  899  657  
Note: Standard output calculated according to  Regulation (EC) No 1242/2008. Region NW includes Piedmont, Lombardy, Liguria and Aosta Valley; region 
NE includes Veneto, Emilia Romagna, Trentino Sud Tirol, Friuli Veneza Giulia and  Emilia Romagna; Region Central Includes Tuscany, Umbria, 
Marche and Lazio, South includes Abruzzi, Molise Apulia, Campania, Basilicata, Calabria; Island includes Sicily and Sardinia.
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Table 6: Summary table of efficiency scores derived from an input oriented non-discretionary 
CRS DEA model
Overall Technical Efficiency SBV CRS model
Efficiency Distribution 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
% of Farms
Eff < 0.5 43.90% 43.99% 37.49% 22.91% 14.62% 18.39% 17.78%
0.5 ≤ Eff < 0.6 17.86% 15.54% 18.40% 18.50% 17.63% 18.88% 15.87%
0.6 ≤ Eff < 0.7 12.79% 11.41% 12.47% 17.26% 22.92% 19.85% 17.68%
0.7 ≤ Eff < 0.8 8.44% 8.11% 9.16% 16.02% 15.18% 14.81% 16.16%
0.8 ≤ Eff < 0.9 5.47% 6.16% 8.01% 10.29% 10.12% 9.60% 11.60%
0.9 ≤ Eff < 1 2.83% 3.60% 4.31% 4.33% 5.93% 5.70% 6.94%
Efficiency = 1 8.70% 11.19% 10.16% 10.68% 13.60% 12.77% 13.97%
Mean Efficiency 0.561 0.580 0.601 0.661 0.700 0.682 0.698
SD Efficiency 0.229 0.235 0.227 0.198 0.188 0.196 0.203
Number of Farms 1517 1332 1299 1292 1265 1229 1052
Note: outliers and observations with either negative outputs or negative inputs dropped
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Table 7: Distribution of the overal technical efficiency decomposition into pure technical and scale efficiency expressed as percentages
Efficiency 
Distribution
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
% of Farms
Pure*1 Scale*2 Pure Scale Pure Scale Pure Scale Pure Scale Pure Scale Pure Scale
eff<0.5 31.64% 3.89% 28.60% 3.75% 17.32% 7.54% 10.22% 2.71% 5.78% 1.26% 8.14% 2.69% 8.37% 2.09%
0.5≤eff<0.6 16.55% 3.69% 14.49% 5.26% 16.47% 4.85% 15.87% 3.17% 12.26% 1.58% 13.67% 2.60% 12.08% 2.19%
0.6≤eff<0.7 12.79% 4.81% 12.01% 6.08% 13.39% 7.78% 17.03% 4.72% 17.48% 5.77% 16.27% 3.34% 13.80% 5.04%
0.7≤eff<0.8 8.37% 7.58% 10.06% 10.74% 12.47% 9.01% 15.09% 9.29% 16.38% 9.17% 14.08% 8.62% 14.65% 8.18%
0.8≤eff<0.9 5.87% 15.49% 7.21% 13.74% 10.16% 15.01% 10.53% 15.94% 11.47% 16.05% 9.52% 16.60% 11.04% 17.13%
0.9≤eff<1 3.76% 55.83% 4.13% 49.25% 5.08% 45.65% 7.51% 53.48% 8.23% 52.57% 7.89% 53.38% 8.94% 51.47%
Efficiency=1 21.03% 8.70% 23.50% 11.19% 25.10% 10.16% 23.76% 10.68% 28.40% 13.60% 30.43% 12.77% 31.11% 13.99%
Mean Efficiency 0.635 0.884 0.666 0.871 0.711 0.845 0.745 0.889 0.776 0.902 0.762 0.898 0.776 0.899
SD Efficiency 0.231 0.229 0.229 0.161 0.208 0.182 0.187 0.141 0.176 0.122 0.190 0.133 0.188 0.133
Number of Farms 1517 1332 1299 1292 1264 1229 10521
*1 = Pure technical efficiency, *2 = Scale efficiency
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Table 8: Exploring the relationship between technical efficiency of Italian arable farms with the lagged DAR and other farm and farm 
management characteristics
 2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Lagged DAR -0.05 0.07 -0.16** 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.07 -0.10 0.07
Share tangible assets -0.26*** 0.03 -0.16*** 0.04 -0.13*** 0.03 -0.16*** 0.03 -0.13*** 0.03 -0.21*** 0.04
Share farm labour -0.13*** 0.04 -0.05 0.05 -0.16*** 0.04 -0.13*** 0.04 -0.12*** 0.05 -0.13** 0.05
Education in years 0.03*** 0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02
Share rented land -0.04** 0.02 -0.06*** 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.05*** 0.02 -0.04* 0.02 -0.06** 0.03
Young -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.05* 0.03
Elder -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02* 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.05*** 0.01 -0.02 0.02
Female -0.06*** 0.02 -0.06*** 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.03** 0.02 -0.03** 0.02 -0.02 0.02
Share rented land -0.04** 0.02 -0.06*** 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.05*** 0.02 -0.04* 0.02 -0.06** 0.03
Farm in total LFA 0.05** 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.04** 0.02 -0.04* 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.02
Region NE 0.23*** 0.02 0.16*** 0.02 0.14*** 0.02 0.07*** 0.02 0.08*** 0.02 0.22*** 0.02
Region Central 0.06*** 0.02 0.04* 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.06*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.02 0.10*** 0.03
Region South -0.06** 0.02 -0.12*** 0.03 0.05*** 0.02 0.03* 0.02 0.04* 0.02 0.10*** 0.03
Region Islands 0.06 0.04 -0.16*** 0.06 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.05
Constant 0.76*** 0.05 0.70*** 0.07 0.81*** 0.05 0.87*** 0.06 0.85*** 0.06 0.86*** 0.09
N 1002  741  953  897  899  657  
Log Likelihood 348  253  388  380  362  292  
Significance codes:  ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 
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Table 9: Exploring the relationship between technical efficiency of Italian arable farms with the lagged long term DAR, the contemporaneous 
short term DAR and other farm and farm management characteristics
 2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  
 Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E. Coef S.E.
Lagged Long term DAR -0.08 0.14 -0.07 0.20 0.26 0.35 -0.27 0.37 -0.23 0.23 0.08 0.28
Contemporaneous Short term DAR -0.08 0.07 -0.19** 0.08 0.14 0.09 -0.06 0.10 0.04 0.07 -0.13 0.09
Share tangible assets -0.25*** 0.03 -0.15*** 0.04 -0.13*** 0.03 -0.15*** 0.03 -0.13*** 0.03 -0.20*** 0.03
Share farm labour -0.13*** 0.04 -0.05 0.05 -0.16*** 0.04 -0.13*** 0.04 -0.12*** 0.05 -0.13** 0.05
Education in years 0.03*** 0.01 0.03* 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02
Share rented land -0.04* 0.02 -0.06*** 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.05** 0.02 -0.04* 0.02 -0.05** 0.02
Young -0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.05* 0.03
Elder -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02* 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.06*** 0.01 -0.02 0.02
Female -0.06*** 0.02 -0.05*** 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.03** 0.02 -0.04** 0.02 -0.02 0.02
Share rented land -0.04* 0.02 -0.06*** 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.05** 0.02 -0.04* 0.02 -0.05** 0.02
Farm in total LFA 0.05** 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.04** 0.02 -0.04** 0.02 -0.03* 0.02 -0.01 0.02
Region NE 0.23*** 0.02 0.15*** 0.02 0.15*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.02 0.08*** 0.02 0.22*** 0.02
Region Central 0.06*** 0.02 0.05* 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.06*** 0.02 0.06*** 0.02 0.10*** 0.03
Region South -0.06** 0.02 -0.12*** 0.03 0.06*** 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04* 0.02 0.10*** 0.03
Region Islands 0.06* 0.04 -0.16*** 0.05 -0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.00 0.05 -0.02 0.05
Constant 0.75*** 0.05 0.69*** 0.07 0.81*** 0.06 0.87*** 0.06 0.85*** 0.06 0.86*** 0.08
N 1002  741  953  897  899  657  
Log Likelihood 348  255  389  381  362  292  
Significance codes:  ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 
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